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Considering Class: College Access and Diversity
Matthew N. Gaertner* & Melissa Hart**
I. INTRODUCTION
Even in the immediate wake of the Supreme Court's June 2013 decision
in Fisher v. University of Texas,' the future of race-conscious affirmative
action remains uncertain. The Fisher decision did not deliver the much-
feared death blow to affirmative action in college admissions. Indeed, the
majority reaffirmed the principle that diversity in higher education is a com-
pelling state interest. At the same time, however, the Court emphatically
cautioned that race-conscious affirmative action could only be used if no
race-neutral approach could achieve the diversity essential to educational
goals. 2 And many commentators have predicted that the decision will lead to
an increase in litigation over college admissions policies. Anticipating this
possibility, colleges and universities will continue to explore what admis-
sions policies will best yield a diverse mix of students. This article suggests
an admissions strategy that accounts for socioeconomic disadvantage, and
presents the results of a study from the University of Colorado that demon-
strates that class-based affirmative action efforts are not only valuable for
* Research Scientist, Center for College and Career Success, Pearson. Thanks to Michael
Bastedo, Derek Briggs, Rick Kahlenberg, Kevin MacLennan, and Katie McClarty for invalua-
ble feedback on earlier drafts of this article. An earlier version of this paper was awarded the
Charles F. Elton Best Paper Award by the Association for Institutional Research. The empiri-
cal material in this article is based upon work supported by the Association for Institutional
Research, the National Center for Education Statistics, the National Science Foundation, and
the National Postsecondary Education Cooperative, under Association for Institutional Re-
search Grant Number DGIO-206. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommenda-
tions expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Association for Institutional Research, the National Center for Education Statistics, the
National Science Foundation, or the National Postsecondary Education Cooperative.
** Associate Professor and Director of the Byron R. White Center for the Study of Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, University of Colorado Law School. Many thanks to Rachel Arnow-
Richman, Roberto Corrada, Deborah Malamud, Steve Martyn, Scott Moss, Helen Norton, Raja
Raghunath, Nantiya Ruan and Richard Sander for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of
this article. I am grateful to Kimberly Jones and Nick Venetz for their invaluable research
assistance.
'Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., - S. Ct. - (2013).
2 Id. The diversity rationale was first endorsed in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
3 See, e.g., Richard Sander, Commentary on Fisher: A Classic Kennedy Compromise,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 24, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/commentay-on-
fisher- a-classic-kennedy-compromise; Roger Clegg, Commentary on Fisher: Better Off Than
we Were a Year Ago, SCOTUSm OG (Jun. 24, 2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/06/commentary-on-fisher-better-off-than-we-were-a-year-ago. As well, on March 25,
2013, the Court granted certiorari in a new case that could present the Court with another
opportunity to evaluate the relationship between race-conscious affirmative action and the
Equal Protection Clause. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, No. 12-682 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2012).
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increasing socioeconomic diversity but may also help schools maintain ra-
cial diversity.
Race-conscious affirmative action is perhaps the most contentious issue
in education policy, and challenges to race-conscious admissions policies,
both in courts and at the ballot box, have been regular events over the past
three decades. 4 When these challenges seem poised to succeed, colleges and
universities realize they may need to alter their admissions policies. When
the threat recedes-as it did with the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter-
schools tend to relax into their settled approaches. Fisher offers another
reprieve, but the decision's tone was so hostile to race-conscious affirmative
action that the reprieve may be a short one.
Policy changes implemented under this kind of political pressure are
hard-pressed to incorporate the kind of careful analysis that a well-crafted
admissions standard needs. Moreover, the question of what kind of admis-
sions approach should replace plans that include race as one factor (if such a
replacement is needed) is controversial. Some seeking to answer that ques-
tion are interested primarily in selecting an admissions policy that will best
serve the aim of maintaining or increasing racial diversity on campuses.6
Starting in the late 1990s, some scholars and education experts began calling
for a focus on socioeconomic diversity, not as a substitute for racial diversity
but as a value in its own right, arguing that it would more accurately identify
those applicants who had overcome hardships in their path to higher educa-
tion.7 And a third, relatively small, group has argued that neither class nor
race should play any role at all in evaluating candidates for admission.
4 In addition to the affirmative action challenges that have reached the Supreme Court,
many suits have reached the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir. 1996); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994). Numerous states have passed
ballot initiatives to eliminate affirmative action. See CAL. CONSI. art. I, § 31 (passed as Pro-
position 209); MICH. CONsT. art. I, § 26 (passed as Proposal 2 in 2000 election); NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 30 (passed as Initiative 424); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1998) (passed as Initia-
tive 200). In addition, Florida Governor Jeb Bush eliminated affirmative action in college
admissions via Executive Order 99-821 (the One Florida Initiative), preempting a vote on a
nearly identical ballot measure in Florida in the 2000 election. See also Michele S. Moses,
John T. Yun & Patricia Marin, AfirmativeAction's Fate: Are 20 More Years Enough?, Eimc.
POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Sept. 10, 2009, available at http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/22/
20.election).
See, e.g., Richard Perez-Pefna, To Enroll More Minority Students, Colleges Work Around
the Courts, N.Y. Trvns (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/college-affirm-
ative-action-policies-change-with-laws.html?pagewanted= all.
6 See id.
See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHIENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE
AcIioN 83-120 (1997); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting With Class-Based Affirmative Ac-
tion, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 474-76 (1997).
' See, e.g., Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 213, 215 (1997); Abigail Thernstrom, A Class Backwards Idea;
Why Affirmative Action for the Needy Won't Work, WASH. Pos i, June 11, 1995, at Cl; Christo-




In 2008, the State of Colorado faced the possibility of the elimination of
affirmative action by means of "Amendment 46," a ballot initiative that
presented voters with the prospect of a state constitutional amendment
prohibiting any consideration of race in education, employment, and public
contracting.9 The consensus around Colorado was that the ballot initiative
was bound to pass."' It was a copycat initiative that had first been intro-
duced in California in 1996 and had since passed in every state in which it
was put on the ballot." But on November 4, 2008, the citizens of Colorado
voted "no" on Amendment 46.12
In anticipation of the vote, Colorado's flagship public institution-the
University of Colorado at Boulder (CU or the University)-started to look
for alternative admissions approaches that would meet the University's inter-
est in admitting a broadly diverse class while complying with a ban on race-
conscious admissions, should that ban become law. To this end, the Univer-
sity explored new statistical approaches to identify and give an admissions
"boost" to students disadvantaged by socioeconomic status.' 3 Using a na-
tionally representative data set,14 CU developed operational definitions of
socioeconomic disadvantage that could be applied in admissions decisions.
The University conducted randomized experiments to estimate the effects of
implementing this class-based approach on both the racial and socioeco-
nomic diversity of accepted classes." This article explains the development,
implementation, and evaluation of this method of identifying disadvantaged
and overachieving applicants in undergraduate admissions. 6
The findings from CU's early experimentation with class-based affirma-
tive action are significant on several fronts. First, in marked contrast to pre-
' See Melissa Hart, The State-by-State Assault on Equal Opportunity, 3 ADVANCE 159,
159-71 (2009).
'0 d. at 171.
" See id.
12 See MICHELE MOSES ET AL., INVESTIG A TING THE DEFEAT OF COLORADo's AMENDMENT
46: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRENDS AND PRINCIPAL FACTORS INFLUENCING VOTER BEHAVIORS 3
(2010), available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/colorado-46/2010-11-12-defeat-of-
amendment46-report-final.pdf.
" In the context of college admissions, a "boost" is defined as an increased likelihood of
admission associated with some applicant characteristic such as legacy status, race, or geogra-
phy. In the research literature, an admissions boost is sometimes quantified as the increase in
the odds of admission and elsewhere quantified in terms of SAT points. See, e.g., RICHARD D.
KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POI ER, A BETTER AFFIRMAIIVE ACTiON: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAI
CREATED Ai TERNATIVES To RACIAL PREFERENCES 5, 20 (2012), available at http://tcf.org/
assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf.
14 Education Longitudinal Study of 2002: Base Year to Second Follow-up Public-Use
Data, NAI'L CENIER FOR Eiuc. STAT. (Mar. 17, 2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pub-
sinfo.asp?pubid 2010338 [hereinafter Education Longitudinal Study of 2002].
' Historical data was also examined to estimate the likelihood of college success for ben-
eficiaries of class-based affirmative action. This aspect of the study is part of a forthcoming
paper.
16 Disadvantage, in this context, is present when socioeconomic factors align to diminish
an applicant's life chances. Overachievement is observed when an applicant's academic per-
formance in high school exceeds the performance of students with similar socioeconomic
backgrounds.
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vious simulations and empirical studies, CU's admissions boost based on
class had significant positive impact on both socioeconomic and racial diver-
sity of admitted students. Second, while most research on affirmative action
has been done at highly selective institutions, the implications of the CU
study are more likely relevant for other moderately selective public institu-
tions-the type of school that serves more than half of the college-going
population. 7 Third, this study is the first empirical analysis of admissions
decisions, as opposed to class composition, under any type of class-based
affirmative action program. This distinction is an important one because
enrollment decisions made by students are influenced by a wide range of
factors beyond the admissions policy implemented by the school.' This
study presents a viable admissions approach that could be adopted by
schools around the country as either an alternative to or an enhancement of
current policy.
We begin in Part II with a brief history of class-based affirmative ac-
tion, exploring the questions of definition and motivation that have ham-
pered efforts to develop robust class-based admissions plans. Part III sets
out the CU study, explaining the objectives, statistical methods, and data that
were central to the plan's development and the results of the policy as ap-
plied to entering students. In Part IV, we consider some of the implications
of this study for the future development of class-based affirmative action
policies at other institutions.
Even if the Supreme Court upholds Grutter, colleges and universities
should consider supplementing their current admissions policies with this
approach. Because socioeconomic status is not a "suspect classification"
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause," class-based
policies are not subject to the same legal uncertainties that face race-con-
" See generally THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALiY A. Dii ow, NAT, CTR. FOR Eiuc. STATIS-
tics, DIGESi OF EDUCATION SLAIisics 2009 282 (2010).
" There are some factors that will go into matriculation decisions that a school can influ-
ence but that are unrelated to admissions policies. Financial aid and recruitment efforts are
two of the most obvious. There are other factors that a school cannot influence, such as the
financial aid and other policies of competing institutions. This article is focused specifically
on how a school's approach to admissions decisions might impact the class or racial composi-
tion of the admitted students. By looking specifically at admissions, rather than enrollment,
we avoid the "noise" of these confounding factors.
' The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme
Court has developed a framework for evaluating government classifications that subjects them
to different levels of review depending on the nature of the classification. Classifications
based on race are subject to the most stringent review and can only be justified when they are
"narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 326 (2003). Classifications based on economic status, by contrast, are subject to
deferential review, and will be upheld so long as the classification "bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see also San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (rejecting argument that wealth-
based classifications should be subject to more stringent review).
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scious admissions policies. 2() Moreover, they target a group of applicants
who have faced significant disadvantage and whose inclusion in the univer-
sity community is an essential part of authentic diversity and equal opportu-
nity. Regardless of this year's outcome for race-conscious affirmative
action, we can expect continuing legal challenges. 21 Schools would be wise
to do their work now so that future admissions policies are not adopted in
the scramble of legal uncertainty. 2
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CLAsS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Higher-education admissions policies are controversial. While there is
general agreement that the collection of factors we consider in admitting
students to college or graduate school ought to be a reflection of our val-
ues, 23 there is significant disagreement about what those values are or should
be. What would it say about a school's values if it were to admit students
based exclusively on SAT scores? Based on high-school class rank? Race
or ethnic background? Athletic ability? Musical talent? Legacy status? Ec-
onomic background? Each of these choices reflects a set of assumptions and
values, and each time a choice is made to include or exclude any of these
elements in the admissions process, it reflects a value judgment by the
school.
20 Some commentators have queried whether race-neutral policies adopted with an eye to
achieving racial diversity would be legally suspect. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Consti-
tutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 Gmo. L.J. 2331, 2333 (2000);
Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL Eiwc. 452, 458
(1997) ("The race-neutral camp is likely to scrutinize class-based affirmative action programs
to make sure that the variables and measurement techniques were not designed to achieve
racial effects. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has signaled that it will treat the design of race-neutral
affirmative action programs as an issue of constitutional significance, and that any effort to
smuggle race in through the back door will be met with heightened scrutiny."). But the Su-
preme Court has concluded that race-neutral programs would be an appropriate approach for
the government to take to address racial inequality. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
509-10 (1989). Thus, the likelihood of successful litigation seems low. See Neil Goldsmith,
Class-Based Affirmative Action: Creating a New Model of Diversity in Higher Education, 34
WASH. U. J.L. & Poi 'Y 313, 315-16 (2010). Of course, if a college or university adopted a
class-based plan with the stated intent of ensuring that a sufficient number of minority students
were admitted under the plan, that kind of explicit statement of intent might well lead to
litigation.
1 See sources cited supra note 3.
22 See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are
We Losing the War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 19 (2005) ("In light of the Court's forewarning of the
eventual termination of race-based affirmative action, colleges and universities should take
advantage of this transition period that affords them the opportunity to employ both race-based
and race-neutral measures simultaneously.").
23 See, e.g., WnH1IAM BOWEN & DEREK BOK, TIHEv SHAPE OF THy RIVER: LONG-TERM CON-
SEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AMISSIoNS 15 (1998); Mi
cm- F S. MOSES, EMBRACING RACE: WHY WE NEED RACE-CONSCIOUs EDUCATION PoLICY 6
(2002).
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Few, if any, schools admit students exclusively based on their standard-
ized test scores or high-school GPAs. Instead, admissions officers seek to
balance the competing values embodied in the range of factors that might
inform an admissions decision. The reality of this complicated balance has
been lost in much of the public debate about race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion. Opponents of race-conscious affirmative action have been extremely
successful in portraying admissions decisions as presenting choices between
"merit" and "diversity."2 4 While this idea of a simple binary choice does
not reflect the realities of the admissions process, it does define the way
courts, commentators and politicians now talk about the process.25 For the
education experts who actually make admissions policy choices, though, the
reality of the complexities of the process cannot be ignored. When race-
conscious affirmative action has been most threatened, schools have not gen-
erally considered it reasonable to ignore diversity entirely and consider only
"merit" in admissions. 26 Instead, uncertainty about race-conscious admis-
sions policies has more frequently led to calls for class-conscious affirmative
action as an alternative.
There are several possible explanations for the persistent interest in
maintaining some form of affirmative action in higher-education admissions
policies. For most schools, an ideal college campus is one that includes
"groups and individuals who historically have faced institutional barriers,
where the quality of education is enhanced and enriched by a diverse cam-
pus community, and where the entire campus benefits from participation in a
multicultural community."27 The educational mission of colleges and uni-
versities includes a commitment to prepare their graduates to lead in diverse
workplaces in a complex society. To effectively achieve this goal, schools
must ensure that they serve a population whose diversity bears some connec-
tion to the diversity of the society the students will graduate into.
Moreover, it has long been one of the principles underlying our system
of education that, as then-Massachusetts Secretary of Education Horace
Mann said in 1848, "Education then, beyond all other devices of human
origin, is a great equalizer of the conditions of men-the balance wheel of
24 See, e.g., WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: My FIGHT AGAINST RACE PREFERENCES
145 (2000); Wendy Kopp, Diversity and Merit in College Admissions: A False Dichotomy,
HUTTINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2012, 10:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wendy-kopp/
college-admissions-fisher-v-university-of-texas b 1953144.html.
25 See, e.g., Eric Hoover, Merit vs. Diversity, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc. (Jan. 17, 2013, 11:32
PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/headcount/merit-vs-diversity/33439.
26 The question of what constitutes "merit" is itself a complex one. To identify merit
solely by test scores and grades is to ignore a broad range of qualities and skills that are
equally important to assessing an applicant's quality.
2 See, e.g., Of/ice of Diversity, Equity and Community Engagement: Vision and Mission,




the social machinery." 28 In the face of historical and persistent inequality,
educational opportunity is among the best tools for increasing equal opportu-
nity more broadly.
With those values in mind, scholars and administrators began exploring
class-based affirmative action as a possible admissions approach about two
decades ago.2 9 For some, class-based affirmative action is attractive prima-
rily as an alternative mechanism for maintaining racial diversity. For others,
class-based affirmative action is attractive on its own terms. As Deborah
Malamud has observed, supporters of class-based affirmative action are di-
vided into two camps: "race-neutral" supporters, who favor class-based con-
siderations solely as a remedy for economic hardship, and "race-conscious"
supporters, who believe class-based considerations can augment or maintain
racial diversity." For both of these camps, there are underlying value as-
sumptions that (1) access to higher education is a benefit that should be
available to those who have overcome significant hardship and (2) school
admissions policies should be developed to enhance equal opportunity and
access.
A. What Is Class-Based Affirmative Action?
Class-based affirmative action comes under a variety of names. It is
alternately referred to as "economic" or "socioeconomic" affirmative ac-
tion, and in some cases loosely characterized as admissions preferences for
the poor.31 Class-based policies are designed to place a "thumb on the
scale" for applicants who have faced obstacles to upward mobility.32 Be-
cause demographic factors can present substantial obstacles to upward mo-
bility, supporters of class-conscious affirmative action support this boost as a
means to level the playing field. Socioeconomic status exerts a powerful
28 David Rohde, Kristina Cooke & Himanshu Ojha, The Decline of the 'Great Equalizer,'
ALLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/
the-decline-of-the-great-equalizer/266455/ (quoting Horace Mann).
29 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 7, at 83-120; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class, Not
Race, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 3, 1995, at 21; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Equal Opportunity Critics,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 17, 1995/July 24, 1995, at 20; see also Steven A. Holmes, The Nation;
Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor Whites, N.Y. TIFs (Aug. 18, 1991), http://
www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/weekinreview/the-nation-mulling-the-idea-of-affirmative-
action-for-poor-whites.html?pagewanted all&src pm (discussing the emerging idea of af-
firmative action based on socioeconomic status as opposed to race).
o Malamud, supra note 20, at 452-53; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action
Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1914-15 (1996) (describing the
two distinct justifications for economically based affirmative action).
31 See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23, at 46; THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA
W. RADFoRD, No LONGER SEPARATE, Noi YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELLIE COLLEGE
ADMISSION AND CAMPUS LIFn 348-55 (2009).
32 WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUIY AND EXCEL-
I ENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 178-83 (2005); see also KAHLENBERG, Supra note 7,
at 101.
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influence on one's likelihood of attending a four-year college. 3 This is espe-
cially true when students live in neighborhoods and attend schools where
disadvantage is concentrated.34 Moreover, socioeconomic status signifi-
cantly impacts the academic measures (e.g., high-school GPAs and standard-
ized-test scores) that admissions officers use to gauge applicants' college
readiness."
While these obstacles to upward mobility are widely acknowledged,
there is no clear consensus about "the definition and operationalization of
economic inequality" for purposes of a class-based affirmative action pol-
icy. 6 The challenges inherent in designing such a policy stem, in large part,
from disagreement about how to define "disadvantaged socioeconomic sta-
tus" and then how to identify students who fit that definition without exces-
sive intrusion and potential for fraud.37 Two principal approaches-top X
percent plans and individualized socioeconomic-status evaluation-have
emerged as the most feasible among class-based policies.
1. Top X Percent Plans
Top X percent plans essentially guarantee college admission to students
with a sufficiently high class rank in their graduating high-school class. This
guarantee means that students from a broad range of neighborhoods, towns,
and counties in a state will be admitted to college. Given socioeconomic
and racial diversity among different parts of a city or state, top X percent
plans have the potential to diversify an entering class of students.
Texas implemented the first top X percent plan in 1997, announcing
that any student graduating from the top ten percent of a Texas high school
was guaranteed admission into a state college or university, including the
state's flagship institutions.31 California followed suit with a commitment to
See Therese Baker & William V61ez, Access to and Opportunity in Postsecondary Edu-
cation in the United States: A Review, 69 Soc. EDuc. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 82, 83, 95 (1996); James
C. Hearn, The Relative Roles of Academic, Ascribed, and Socioeconomic Characteristics in
College Destinations, 57 Soc. EDuc. 22, 27-28 (1984); Edward L. McDill & James Coleman,
Family and Peer Influences in College Plans of High School Students, 38 Soc. EDuc. 112, 112
(1965); Gary Orfield, Public Policy and College Opportunity, 98 AM. J. EDuc. 317, 336
(1990); Laura W. Perna, Differences in the Decision to Attend College among African Ameri-
cans, Hispanics, and Whites, 71 J. HIGHER EDUc. (SPECIAL ISSUn) 117, 125 (2000).
3 See John T. Yun & Jos6 F. Moreno, College Access, K-12 Concentrated Disadvantage,
and the Next 25 Years of Education Research, 35 EDuc. RESEARCHER 12, 18 (2006).
3 See Stephen V. Cameron & James J. Heckman, The Dynamics of Educational Attain-
ment for Black, Hispanic, and White Males, 109 J. Poi. EcON. 455, 492 (2001); Sylvia
Hurtado, Karen K. Inkelas, Charlotte Briggs & Byung-Shik Rhee, Differences in College Ac-
cess and Choice Among Racial/Ethnic Groups: Identifying Continuing Barriers, 38 REs.
HIGHER EDLc. 43, 65 (1997); Phillip Kaufman & Xianglei Chen, Projected Postsecondary
Outcomes of 1992 High School Graduates 8-10 (Nat'1 Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Working Paper
No. 1999-15, 1999).
6 See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74
TEx. L. REv. 1847, 1850 (1996).
3 See, e.g., Sander, supra note 7, at 476-81.
" See Mark C. Long, Race and College Admissions: An Alternative to Affirmative Ac-
tion?, 86 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1020, 1020-21 (2004).
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guarantee admission to one of the state colleges or universities for students
in the top four percent of their in-state high-school class who completed
certain coursework. 9 And Florida guarantees admission to the top twenty
percent of Florida high-school graduates, provided they complete a college
preparatory curriculum. 40
Although relatively simple to implement, these plans have been met
with some skepticism. As the population of students in Texas, California,
and Florida has increased, serious concerns have arisen about the feasibility
of guaranteeing admission to any predetermined percentage of graduating
high-school students. In Texas, for example, the Legislature recently capped
the total percentage of any University of Texas at Austin class that was made
up of Top Ten Percent admits because the policy was effectively eliminating
any flexibility and discretion in admissions decisions.4 1 Moreover, the effec-
tiveness of a top X percent plan at increasing either socioeconomic or racial
diversity depends on high-school communities being racially and economi-
cally segregated. 42 While this reflects a sad reality of the current distribution
of housing, it is morally problematic to rest an admissions policy on the
continuation of segregated living. Finally, critics of top X percent plans
have raised concerns about the potential "creaming" effect: even at ex-
tremely poor high schools, the most affluent students will likely rise to the
top of the class. 43
2. Individualized Evaluation of Socioeconomic Status
Supporters of the class-based philosophy argue that the limitations of
top X percent plans specifically should not reflect poorly on the prospects of
class-based affirmative action in general. 44 These advocates stress the need
to account for the varying obstacles individual applicants have faced-a
consideration absent from top X percent plans. An individualized evaluation
of socioeconomic status takes account of measurable factors related to socio-
economic hardship that are critical for flagging disadvantaged applicants. 45
Numerous colleges and universities now include socioeconomic status
as some part of a holistic admissions process. 46 For example, the University
9 Id. at 1020.
40 Id.
41 See Update on Texas Top 10% Plan for Your Students, INTERCULTURAL DEv. Rus.
Ass'N, http://www.idra.org/images/stories/Update%20on%2OTexas%2OTop%2010.pdf (last
visited May 18, 2013).
42 See Marta Tienda & Sunny Niu, Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas Top 10% Plan: A
Test of the "Brain Drain" Hypothesis, 77 J. HIGHER Eixc. 712, 732 (2006).
4' Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and
Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA'S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: Low-INCOME STUDENTS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 150-51 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004); see also Malamud, supra
note 20, at 458.
4 KAHLENBERG & POTTER, supra note 13, at 18-25.
4 See Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access Is Increasing
Inequality, and What to Do About It, in REWARDING SIRIVERS: HELPING Low-INCOME SI-
)ENTS SUCCEED IN COLLEGE 71, 167-83 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010).
46 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 7, at 123-24.
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of Texas "Personal Achievement Index," one part of the holistic review pro-
cess, includes the following relevant factors: the applicant's socioeconomic
background, whether the applicant is from a single-parent home, the socio-
economic status of the applicant's high school, the language primarily spo-
ken in the applicant's home, any special family responsibilities the applicant
may have had, and the average SAT/ACT scores at the student's high school
compared to the student's own score.47 Each of these factors is designed to
give some weight to disadvantaged socioeconomic status. Other schools
have similar holistic review policies.48
The consideration of class is, in fact, nothing new for admissions pro-
fessionals. Admissions officers have long recognized and tried to account
for the damaging effects of low socioeconomic status on likelihood of ad-
mission to a four-year college or institution.49 As Bob Laird, former Dean of
Admissions at the University of California, Berkeley, has explained, how-
ever, such considerations vary from institution to institution and are not
often implemented systematically."o That uneven implementation seems to
have resulted in a small net effect for class-based considerations. Recent
analyses suggest that on average, universities still grant little to no prefer-
ence to low-income college applicants."
B. Does Class-Based Affirmative Action Work?
Whether class-based affirmative action is effective or not depends on
what impact institutions or researchers intend the policy to have. One obvi-
ous benefit of an effective class-based affirmative action policy would be to
increase the socioeconomic diversity of an admitted class. Most research on
class-based programs, however, has not investigated this impact as a primary
focus.52 Class-based approaches often take hold in the wake of a ban on
race-conscious affirmative action. Because such class-based programs im-
mediately follow-and implicitly replace-race-based programs, class-
4' Brief for Respondents at 12-15, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (U.S. Aug. 6,
2012).
48 See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
1037, 1067 (1996) (cataloging schools with policies that give special consideration to students
from disadvantaged backgrounds). In 1997, the UCLA School of Law experimented with a
more sophisticated system of class-based preferences in admissions. Unlike the inclusion as
one or several factors in a holistic review that has generally been the mechanism for consider-
ing class in college admissions, the UCLA approach gave a specific boost for class and sought
to operationalize a definition of disadvantaged socioeconomic status that would capture the
complexity of the concept. See Sander, supra note 7, at 482-87.
49 See Bon LAIRD, TIHE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
142-56 (2005).
o See id.
s See WnI.TTAM G. BownN, M.A. Kunzwvnn & E.M. TOmIN, EQUITY AND ExcEILENCE IN
AMERUCAN HIGHER EUCATION 161-93 (2005); ESPENSHADE & RvADEoR, supra note 31, at
99; Carnevale & Rose, supra note 43, at 127-35.
52 Sander's analysis of the UCLA School of Law class-based admissions system is an




based affirmative action is usually evaluated in terms of its success in main-
taining levels of racial diversity.
For achieving diversity, class-sensitive admissions policies seem well
suited to replace race-based affirmative action given the well-documented
correlation among race, social class, and opportunity.5 4 But up to now, the
research on class-based policies has shown these policies to be poor substi-
tutes for race-conscious admissions in maintaining racial diversity. The fail-
ure of top X percent plans to maintain levels of minority representation has
been widely documented." Individualized socioeconomic status evaluations
have had similarly limited success. 6
The failures of these class-based approaches to achieve desired levels of
racial diversity seem to vindicate the nearly unanimous conclusions of prom-
inent affirmative action researchers that "[t]he correlation between income
and race is not nearly high enough that one can simply serve as a proxy for
the other."5 7 In The Shape of the River, William Bowen and Derek Bok used
simulations to demonstrate that class-based policies would not be effective
replacements for race-conscious affirmative action." Bowen and Bok ex-
plain that race-based considerations at most selective universities offer a
large admissions boost. 9 Even if universities were to grant low-income stu-
" See, e.g., Peter Hinrichs, The Effects oJAffirmative Action Bans on College Enrollment,
Educational Attainment, and the Demographic Composition of Universities, 94 Rv. EcON. &
STAT. 712 (2012); Mark C. Long & Marta Tienda, Winners and Losers: Changes in Texas
University Admissions Post-Hopwood, 30 EDUC. EVALUATION & Poi'Y ANALYSIs 255, 255
(2008).
54 See ELUAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COM-
MUNITY 7-55 (1990); CHRISTINE E. SiEETnR, MAKING CHOICES FOR MULTICULTURAL EDUCA-
TION: FivE APPROACHES To RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER 5-12 (2003); Jeanne Brooks-Gunn &
Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Children, FUTURE CHID., Summer/Fall 1997, at 55,
61-62.
5 See, e.g., CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, THE Civn RIGHTS PROJECT, PnR-
CENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES' EXPER-
IENCES (2003), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/
admissions/percent-plans-in-college-admissions-a-comparative-analysis-of-three-states20l9-
experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf; Mark C. Long, Affirmative Action and its Alterna-
tives in Public Universities: What Do We Know?, 67 PLB. AIN. REv. 315, 321-23 (2007);
Long, supra note 38, at 1030-33; Long & Tienda, supra note 53; Lauren Saenz, Education
Policy by Ballot Box: Examining the Impact of Anti-Affirmative Action Initiatives. (Jan. 3,
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder) (on file with
author).
51 See, e.g., Sander, supra note 7, at 473; Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor
Sander, 47 J. LEGAL. Eiuc. 504, 504-09 (1997) (discussing the racial impact of UCLA's
class-based plan, and in particular its negative impact on black applicants).
5 See NAT'L ACAD. OF EuC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO
SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 42 (Robert L. Linn &
Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/Brief-NAE.pdf; see
also Thomas J. Kane, Misconceptions in the Debate Over Affirmative Action in College Admis-
sions, in CHILLING ADMISSIoNS: THE AFFIRMAIIVE AcLON CRISIS AND ILE SEARCH FOR AL-
TERNATIVES 17, 24-25 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1999) ("Class cannot be
substituted for race in affirmative action admissions without substantial effects on campus
diversity. The problem is in the numbers.").
5 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23, at 15-52.
5 Id. at 26-31; see also Long, supra note 38, at 1025-27.
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dents "minority-size" boosts, racial diversity would plummet because mi-
nority status and poverty are not sufficiently correlated. These simulations
have been reproduced in subsequent research, and their results are consist-
ently confirmed.60
As we discuss further below, the results of the CU study are contrary to
these conclusions. The class-based approach developed at CU led to slightly
increased admission rates for underrepresented-minority applicants. At least
as important, the policy led to increased admission rates for students from
disadvantaged backgrounds, serving the independent reasons for giving an
admissions boost to students who have overcome the adversity attendant to
economic disadvantage. Future research on class-based policies at colleges
and universities should focus more attention on the effectiveness of these
policies at increasing opportunity for these students. The study presented
here takes an important first step in this direction.
III. THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO CLAsS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION POLICY
As in many other states, it was the possible elimination of race-con-
scious affirmative action that first prompted Colorado's flagship university
to explore implementing a class-based policy. The introduction of Amend-
ment 46 posed serious challenges to CU's mission. It is the policy of the
University to recruit and admit students possessing perspectives and life ex-
periences that will provide a unique contribution to the campus environment.
Moreover, CU seeks applicants who have overcome significant adversity,
and is dedicated to building racial and socioeconomic diversity among its
students.' Because the ballot initiative had been successful in other states,
and Amendment 46 was polling favorably in early 2008, the Office of Ad-
missions feared it would lose a critical tool with the passage of this
initiative.
Before 2008, socioeconomic status (SES) had been a factor that could
be considered in the CU admissions process, but the University had never
developed a systematic approach to considering class and giving students an
admissions boost based on that consideration. University administrators
were aware of the arguments for class-based affirmative action as a substi-
tute for race-based policies, and had observed the mixed success achieved by
other states that implemented class-based considerations once race-based
policies were banned. The University hoped to improve upon class-based
6o See BownN, KURZwEIn & ToBIN, supra note 51, at 178-93; ESPYNSHADE & RADFORD,
supra note 31; Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost ofAdmission
Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 Soc. Sci. Q. 293, 296-303 (2005); Richard H. Sander, A
Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REv. 367,
468-478 (2004).
61 See Office of Diversity, supra note 27.
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approaches developed in other states and in the scholarly literature.6 2 More
specifically, the University sought to develop a class-based system that
could (1) increase socioeconomic diversity on campus and (2) reasonably
maintain minority representation, while complying with an anticipated ban
on the consideration of race in college admissions.
A. Selection of Data and Development of Indices
The University of Colorado's class-based metrics differ from those im-
plemented in other contexts-including top X percent plans or race-neutral
admissions systems with individualized socioeconomic indicators. In this
section, we elaborate on the conceptual foundation for CU's class-based sys-
tem. Richard Kahlenberg's description of the goals embodied in class-based
affirmative action was critical to the early-stage development of CU's ap-
proach.6 Essentially, it is Kahlenberg's position that for many high-school
students, socioeconomic obstacles prevent access to college and all the bene-
fits (occupational prestige, increased wages) that subsequently accrue from
attending college.6 4 So, first, any class-based system seeking to compensate
for those obstacles must recognize and attempt to account for socioeconomic
barriers to college access. Second, Kahlenberg argues that many high-
school students' academic credentials (e.g., SAT scores) are depressed by
variables outside their control (e.g., family income)." Some such students
perform much better than one would predict based on their backgrounds.
The concept is not entirely novel; other researchers have labeled such stu-
dents "strivers." 66
With these starting principles, CU sought to quantify the obstacles to
life chances each applicant faced, and the extent to which that applicant had
overcome those obstacles. Put another way, the University developed mea-
sures to capture two applicant traits-disadvantage and overachievement.
"Obstacles to life chances" are construed as disadvantage, and that trait is
quantified as the reduction, owing to socioeconomic circumstance, in an ap-
plicant's likelihood of attending a four-year college. This is the "Disadvan-
tage Index." "Overcoming obstacles" is construed as overachievement, and
that trait is quantified as the extent to which an applicant's academic creden-
tials (SAT scores, ACT scores, and high-school GPA) exceed what is ex-
pected, conditional on socioeconomic factors. These are the
"Overachievement Indices." The sections that follow elaborate on the sta-
tistical methods that underlie each Index.
62 See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 7; Carnevale & Rose, supra note 43; Sander, supra
note 7, at 476-81.
6 See KAHLENBERG, supra note 7, at 83-120.
64 See id. at 86- 101.
65 See id.
66 See Carnevale & Strohl, supra note 45, at 93.
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1. The Disadvantage Index
The Disadvantage Index is derived from two prediction equations. Spe-
cifically, one number is calculated for each applicant: the marginal increase
or decrease in the probability of four-year-college enrollment, owing to so-
cioeconomic circumstance. The Disadvantage Index is based upon a logistic
regression model, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator of en-
rollment in a four-year college in October following a student's graduation
from high school. The binary logistic regression model is presented in the
following equation:
P (E = 1) = exp(X 1 ± kZj)1 + exp(pX + Zj)
In the model above, individuals are indexed by i (i = 1, . . . , N). The
variable E takes a value of "I" if applicant i enrolls in a four-year college,
and 0 otherwise. Let Xi be a vector of academic credentials and Z, be a
vector of socioeconomic measures for applicant i. Let P and k represent the
two vectors of parameters associated with X and Z,, respectively. The as-
sociations between academic credentials (Xi) or socioeconomic measures
(Z,) and college enrollment are quantified via parameters in P and k. So, for
example, when a parameter estimate associated with a particular academic
credential (say, SAT scores) is positive, increases in that academic credential
translate to increases in the probability of college enrollment.
Independent variables used in this logistic model fall into three separate
categories. Student-level socioeconomic variables (included in the vector
Z;) are (1) whether the applicant's native language is English, (2) parents'
highest education level, (3) family income level, and (4) the number of de-
pendents in the family. High-school-level socioeconomic variables (also in-
cluded in the vector Z,) are (5) whether the applicant attended a rural high
school, (6) the school-wide percentage of students eligible for free or re-
duced-price lunch (%FRL), (7) the school-wide student-to-teacher ratio, and
(8) the size of the 12th-grade class. Student-level academic credentials (in-
cluded in the vector X;) are (9) high-school cumulative weighted GPA
(HSGPA) and (10) the higher of two standardized-admissions-test scores
(ACT composite or SAT combined). These Disadvantage Index predictors
are presented in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. Socioeconomic and Academic Predictors for the
Disadvantage Index
Student-Level SES High- School- Level SES Student- Level Academic
Predictors Predictors Predictors
Native Language English Rural High School High School GPA
Parents' Education %FRL ACT Composite
Family Income Student-to-Teacher Ratio SAT Combined
Dependents 12th-Grade Enrollment
Of course, a low probability of enrolling in college does not necessarily
signal disadvantage; a student's academic credentials may simply indicate he
or she is not ready for college-level work. Thus, a further step is necessary
for calculating the Disadvantage Index: two differentyprobabilities are com-
puted for any given applicant. The first is P(E = II PXi, tZ 1), which repre-
sents the probability that applicant i will enroll in college given his or her
specific academic credentials (X;) and socioeconomic measures (Z,). The
second is P(Ei = 1|11Xi, Z*), which is identical to the first probability with
one important change: the values for the socioeconomic variables are fixed
at those of a "typical" applicant. This distinction is represented by the sub-
stitution of Z* for Z,. For continuous socioeconomic measures, the values
for a "typical" applicant are defined as the mean from the full distribution of
applicants. For categorical or ordinal predictors, values for the typical appli-
cant are defined as the mode. Those typical values are presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Typical CU Applicant
Socioeconomic Variable Value
Native Language English Yes
Parents' Highest Level of Education 4-Year College
Family Income $100,000 - $199,000
Dependents 2
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The Disadvantage Index (DI) represents the difference between the two
probabilities defined above. Essentially, the DI value tells us how an appli-
cant's socioeconomic background has impacted his or her chances of going
to college. Larger negative values are interpreted as more disadvantage. 67
DI = P(Ei = 1|3X, tZ1) P(Ei = 1| 3X,Z*)
At this point it is useful to apply the Disadvantage Index equation
above to an example applicant to illustrate how low socioeconomic status
results in negative values for this index. To that end, let us consider James.
His parents make between $15,000 and $35,000 per year. James is a native
English speaker, and there are three dependents in James's family. Both his
parents finished high school and attended some college, but neither gradu-
ated. Seventy percent of the students at James's high school are FRL eligi-
ble. James attends a rural high school, with one hundred students in the
12th-grade class and a school-wide student-to-teacher ratio of fifteen. His
HSGPA is 2.7, and he scored 20 on the ACT. Computing a Disadvantage
Index value for James requires regression coefficients (i.e., parameter esti-
mates for P and k) for the logistic model underlying this index. Those esti-
mates are presented in Table 3. Later in this section, we will discuss how
these parameters were estimated.
The parameter estimates68 in Table 3 enable calculation of James's Dis-
advantage Index. That calculation is performed via the sequence of equa-
tions below. First, James's probability of enrolling in a four-year college is
calculated. The numbers in parentheses represent James's specific socioeco-
nomic and academic values. Those numbers are multiplied by the corre-
sponding parameter estimates given in Table 3.
exp(-2.07 - 0.07(1) - 0.06(3) + 0.39 - 0.15(1) - 0.003(70) - 0.03(15) + 0.0001(100) + 0.86(2.7) + 0.6(-0.21))
1 + exp(-2.07 - 0.07(1) - 0.06(3) + 0.39 - 0.15(1) - 0.003(70) - 0.03(15) + 0.0001(100) + 0.86(2.7) + 0.6(-0.21))
=0.391
Next, CU calculates James's probability of enrolling in a four-year col-
lege, with his socioeconomic characteristics fixed at values for a typical CU
applicant. In the equation below, only the last two terms (associated with
academic credentials) on the right-hand sides of the numerator and denomi-
nator refer specifically to James.
exp(-2.07 - 0.07(1) + 0.11(2) + 0.71- 0.15(0) - 0.003(15) - 0.03(18) + 0.0001(400) + 0.86(2.7) + 0.6(-0.21))
1 + exp(-2.07 - 0.07(1) + 0.11(2) + 0.71 - 0.15(0) - 0.003(15) - 0.03(18) + 0.0001(400) + 0.86(2.7) + 0.6(-0.21))
=0.636
67 For further clarification, a visual representation of this index is provided in Appendix A.
" The parameter estimates in Table 3 suggest that of all socioeconomic predictors, parents'
education exhibits the strongest association with college enrollment. The coefficients in Table
3 are not readily interpretable; the exponential function must be applied to reveal how changes
in the predictor variables are associated with changes in the odds of college enrollment. So, all
else equal, students whose parents engaged in some postgraduate study are 2.4 times (e")
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Finally, James's Disadvantage Index value represents the difference be-
tween the two probabilities computed above:
DIjmes = 0.391 - 0.636 = -0.245 = -24.5%
So, relative to the SES of a typical CU applicant, James's low SES has
reduced his estimated probability of enrolling in college by 24.5 percentage
points. Later in this section, we discuss CU's approach to determining which
values for this index represent substantial disadvantage.
2. The Overachievment Indices
The three Overachievement Indices are derived from three prediction
equations.' Two to three values are calculated for each applicant, as a func-
69 Development of the Overachievement Indices followed the work of Roger Studley at
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tion of that applicant's (1) high-school cumulative weighted GPA, (2) ACT
composite score, and (3) SAT combined score." The Overachievement Indi-
ces' prediction equations are based on three separate multiple-regression
models, where the dependent variables in each case are (1) HSGPA, (2) ACT
composite score, and (3) SAT combined score. The general form is as
follows:
Y = OK + E1
In the model above, individuals are indexed by i (i = 1, . . . , N). Y is
the value for the academic credential under examination (HSGPA, ACT, or
SAT). Let K be a vector of socioeconomic measures. Let 0 be a vector of
parameters associated with K. The unobserved error term is represented by
E,. Independent variables (i.e., the vector K,) used in the Overachievement
Index are nearly identical to the socioeconomic variables employed in the
Disadvantage Index. Student-level variables include (1) the applicant's na-
tive language, (2) single-parent status, (3) parents' education level, (4) fam-
ily-income level, and (5) the number of dependents in the family. High-
school-level socioeconomic variables include (6) whether the applicant at-
tended a rural high school, (7) %FRL, (8) student-to-teacher ratio, and (9)
the size of the 12th-grade class. The associations between socioeconomic
measures (Ki) and academic credentials (Yi) are quantified via parameters in
0. So, when a parameter estimate associated with a particular socioeco-
nomic measure (say, family income) is positive, increases in that socioeco-
nomic measure translate to increases in the academic credential. The
Overachievement Indices' predictors are presented in Table 4 below.
TABLE 4. Socioeconomic Predictors for the Overachievement Indices
Student-Level SES High-School-Level SES
Predictors Predictors
Native Language English Rural High School
Single Parent %FRL
Parents' Education Student-to-Teacher Ratio
Family Income 12th-Grade Enrollment
Dependents
and College Admissions: A Remedy for Underrepresentation, CENTER FOR STUD. HIGHER
EDuc. REs. & OCCASSIONAL PAPER SERms, Feb. 2003, No. CSHE.1.03, available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/cshe/CSHE1-03.
o Because applicants to CU are required to take either the ACT or the SAT, most appli-
cants (roughly 73%) have an Overachievement Index for only one of those two admissions
tests.
1 For the Overachievement Indices, SAT scores represent the sum of scores on the math
and verbal sections of the SAT.
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For any given academic credential Y, the Overachievement Index (01) value
for applicant i is based on e,, the residual from the multiple regression
above.72
Ohl = ej = Y - OKj
The 01 values tell us how an applicant's high-school academic creden-
tials compare to those of students with similar socioeconomic backgrounds.
Rather than reporting a student's raw HSGPA or test scores, this approach
estimates the student's achievement beyond what is predicted by his or her
socioeconomic circumstance. The difference between what was predicted
for a given applicant and what he or she actually achieved functions as a
measure of achievement beyond circumstance. Positive values are inter-
preted as overachievement.
Again, it may be helpful to apply one Overachievement Index equation
(the SAT measure) to an example applicant. This time, let us consider San-
dra. Sandra's mother makes between $35,000 and $60,000 annually. Sandra
is a native English speaker, and she is an only child living with a single
parent. Her mother attended some college, but did not graduate. Sandra
attends an urban high school where forty percent of the students are eligible
for free or reduced-price lunch. There are five hundred students in her 12th-
grade class, and the school-wide student-to-teacher ratio is fifteen. Sandra
has earned a 3.1 GPA in high school and scored 1170 on the SAT. As with
the previous example, computing an Overachievement Index (SAT) value
requires the parameter estimates for 0. Those are provided in Table 5.
The parameter estimates7 in Table 5 enable calculation of Sandra's
Overachievement Index (SAT), and that calculation is presented via the se-
quence of equations below. First, her predicted SAT score-conditional on
socioeconomic measures-is computed. The numbers in parentheses re-
present Sandra's socioeconomic values; those numbers are multiplied by the
corresponding parameter estimates shown in Table 5.
923.25 - 16.96(1) - 38.53(1) - 6.54(1) + 34.82 + 56.01 - 7.77(0) - 2.53(40) - 0.04(500) + 3.8(15)
= 888
Next, the Overachievement Index (SAT) is computed by subtracting
Sandra's SES-predicted SAT combined score from her observed score.
OSandra = 1170 - 888 = 282
So, Sandra has scored 282 points above the average SAT combined
score of students with similar socioeconomic backgrounds. Later in this sec-
72 For further clarification, a visual representation of the Overachievement Indices is pro-
vided in Appendix B.
" A one-unit increase in any predictor variable (e.g., single-parent status) is associated
with a change in the outcome variable (e.g., SAT combined score) equal to the parameter
estimate. So, single-parent status, all else equal, translates to a thirty-nine-point decrease in
predicted SAT score. In each case, increases in parents' education and income are associated
with increases in academic credentials, while increases in %FRL are associated with decreases
in academic credentials.
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TABLE 5. Parameter Estimates for CU's Models of HSGPA, ACT scores,
and SAT scores
HSGPA ACT Composite SAT Combined
OLS OLS OLS
Independent (Predictor) Variables Etate S.E Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E
Intercept 2.60 0.005 1681 0.044 923.25 1L680
Native Language English -0.05 0.002 0.94 0. 021 -16.96 0.809
Single Parent -0.19 0.002 -0.96 0.015 -38.53 0.643
Dependents -0.03 0.001 -0.15 0.004 -6.54 0.200
Income @ $0 - $14,999 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income @ $15,000 - $34,999 0.03 0.002 0.28 0.010 16.02 0.320
Income @ $35.000 - $49,999 0.07 0.001 0.54 0.009 34.82 0.540
Income @$50,000 - $74,999 0.09 0.001 0.87 0.003 58.11 0.160
Income @ $75.000 - $99,999 0.13 <0.001 1.19 0.001 72.40 0.620
Income(@ $10000 - $199,999 0.17 <0. 001 1.45 0.006 88.30 0.560
income@ $199,000- 0.19 0.002 1.74 0.007 105.61 1.400
Parents' Highest Level of Education
NoSome High School 0.00 0.00 0.00
High School Graduate 0.09 0.002 0.71 0.010 29.60 0.650
Some College 0.16 0.001 1.45 0.003 56.01 0.740
2-year College Graduate 0.26 0.003 2.01 0.012 88.14 1.610
4-year College Graduate 0.33 <0.001 2.93 0.001 117.43 0.800
Postgraduate Study 0.46 0.003 3.52 0.002 146.34 0.980
Rural High School 0.13 0.002 0.61 0.014 -7.77 0.639
High School Percent FR Lunch -0.004 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 -2.53 0.017
Size of 12th-Grade Class -0.0002 <0.001 0.0001 <0.001 -0.04 0.001
Student-to-Teacher Ratio 0.03 <0.001 0.12 0.002 3.80 0.065
Model Summary Statistics
R 0.12 0.19 0.19
Standard Error of the Estimate 0.69 4.31 180
tion we discuss an approach to determining which values represent substan-
tial overachievement.
3. Data Sources
The parameters in the Indices' regression models (i.e., p, k, and 0) were
estimated using extant data. For these estimates, the University of Colo-
rado's class-based system relies on the Education Longitudinal Study (ELS)
database.74 The ELS data contain information on a nationally representative
cohort of students followed through high school and postsecondary endeav-
ors from 2002 to 2006. The ELS database is the most complete resource
available for quantifying the relationships between socioeconomic status,
high-school academic credentials, and four-year college enrollment. Histori-
cally, CU has not collected detailed socioeconomic data from its applicants;
nor has it investigated whether applicants who did not come to CU eventu-
ally enrolled in another four-year institution. Because ELS collected socio-
economic and academic data from respondents in high school, and tracked
" See Education Longitudinal Study of 2002, supra note 14.
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students' progress beyond high school, this database was uniquely suited for
constructing the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. Moreover,
ELS allowed CU to avoid a weakness of other class-based approaches-the
reliance on simulated enrollment outcomes rather than empirical enrollment
data.
4. Choosing Socioeconomic Variables
In theory, the list of variables used as predictors in the Indices' regres-
sion models could be expanded. One could conceive of additional variables
not included in these models that nonetheless explain variation in college
enrollment or high-school academic credentials. The University of Colo-
rado's class-based measures are subject to data constraints, which merit ex-
planation here. Two preliminary criteria had to be met in order for an
independent variable to be included in the Indices' regression models. First,
data on that variable needed to be available for the CU applicant pool, either
through the student application for admission or an otherwise reliable source
(e.g., high-school-level data were pulled from the NCES Common Core of
Data). Second, the variable needed to be present in the ELS data. These
criteria immediately eliminated some potentially useful explanatory vari-
ables from the development of the Indices. For example, exploratory analy-
ses in ELS indicated that the percentage of students in an applicant's high
school who enrolled in a postsecondary institution may impact that appli-
cant's likelihood of attending college. This predictor could not be included
in the Disadvantage Index because, while it is present in ELS, it is not read-
ily available for CU applicants. In addition, it is reasonable to suspect status
as a foster child might affect a student's likelihood of attending college. Un-
fortunately, while this information is collected from CU applicants, it is not
available in ELS.
B. Implementation of the Indices in Admissions Decisions
Once the parameters for the regression models were estimated and the
Indices' prediction equations were formed, CU established numerical thresh-
olds along each Index's scale to establish successive categories of disadvan-
tage or overachievement. Categories were necessary because the Indices
represented unfamiliar scales for admissions personnel. Defining categories
helped admissions staff determine the values that represent substantial disad-
vantage or overachievement. Under the Disadvantage Index, those catego-
ries are "no disadvantage," "moderate disadvantage," and "severe
disadvantage." Overachievement categories are "no overachievement,"
"high overachievement," and "extraordinary overachievement." We pre-
sent the thresholds that define these categories in Table 6.
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TABLE 6. Disadvantage and Overachievement Thresholds for the Indices
Measure Threshold Measure Threshold
Disadvantage Index Overachievement Index (SAT)
Moderate Disadvantage -6.3% High Overachievement 151
Severe Disadvantage -19,0% Extraordinary Overachievement 273
Overachievement Index (HSGPA) Overachievement Index (ACT)
High Overachievement 0,57 High Overachievement 3.9
Extraordinary Overachievement 1.06 Extraordinary Overachievement 7.5
With these thresholds in mind, let us return to the example applicants,
Sandra and James. Both are flagged by the Indices. Specifically, Sandra's
Overachievement Index (SAT) value of 282 places her in the "extraordinary
overachievement" category. James's reduced chances of college enrollment
(a Disadvantage Index value of -24.5 percentage points) places him in the
"severe disadvantage" category.
Utilization of the Indices by admissions personnel relies on these cate-
gories. Applicants like Sandra and James-those who experience moderate
or severe disadvantage or exhibit high or extraordinary overachievement-
are granted additional consideration (i.e., given a boost) during application
review. No applicant identified under either Index may be refused admis-
sion outright; any application exhibiting disadvantage or overachievement
must, at the very least, be referred to a committee of admissions officers for
holistic review (i.e., a comprehensive second look). Additionally, identifica-
tion under either Index can serve as a primary or secondary factor for admis-
sion without further review. Primary and secondary factors comprise all
measures and indicators admissions officers use to evaluate undergraduate
applications. Secondary factors in the admissions process are generally less
influential. Underrepresented minority (URM)75 status and legacy status are
examples of secondary factors. Primary factors, however, are quite influen-
tial. They include, among other things, standardized-test scores and high-
school course-taking patterns. As such, identification under the Disadvan-
tage and Overachievement Indices can wield powerful influence over an ap-
plicant's prospects for admission. Table 7 below details the implementation
of the Indices in admissions decisions. In Table 7, "high overachievement"
and "extraordinary overachievement" refer to any of the Overachievement
Index values (i.e., GPA or test scores). An applicant need only overachieve
on one of these measures to earn additional consideration.








No additional Secondary factor Primary factor
consideration boost boost
Moderate Secondary factor Prinzary factor Primary factor
Disadvantage boost boost boost
Priniaty factor Prinzary factor Primary factor
boost boost boost
Table 7 illustrates how applicants like Sandra and James are handled
under CU's class-based approach. Recall that Sandra has a high-school GPA
of 3.1 and a combined score of 1170 on the SAT. With respect to raw aca-
demic credentials, Sandra's application is not extraordinarily strong. She is
on the cusp of admission to CU. However, according to the thresholds elab-
orated in Table 6, Sandra has demonstrated extraordinary overachievement.
We will not detail the arithmetic that produces other Index values for Sandra,
but it is important to note that her Disadvantage Index value does not cross
any thresholds. Therefore, Sandra is located in the right-hand column, first
row of Table 7. She has earned a primary factor boost, which will considera-
bly increase her chances of acceptance.
At this point, a reasonable question may be posed: Why use two indi-
ces? More specifically, if the Overachievement Indices effectively adjust
high school academic credentials for the socioeconomic variables that influ-
ence them, what more is required of class-based affirmative action? Why
measure disadvantage? The need for the Disadvantage Index may be best
illustrated by way of our other example applicant-James. First, James's
academic credentials (HSGPA of 2.7 and a composite score of 20 on the
ACT) are roughly where one would expect them to be given James's back-
ground, so he is not identified by the Overachievement Indices. Still, he is
flagged as having experienced "severe disadvantage," so James receives a
primary factor boost. He would be located in the left-hand column, bottom
row of Table 7.
James is not flagged by the Overachievement Indices, but he possesses
relevant qualifications that CU would like to recognize in its undergraduate
admissions process. That is, while his raw academic credentials may not
understate his potential, when James enters CU he will be able to draw on
life experiences that most of his undergraduate peers will not. Thus, James
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should bring views and perspectives to the University that would be absent
were he refused admission. Significantly, the Overachievement Indices are
not designed to identify the traits James exhibits. It is the Disadvantage
Index that reveals relevant qualifications in this case.
The Index definitions presented above, coupled with the implementa-
tion procedures detailed in Table 7, form the conceptual grounding for CU's
system of class-based affirmative action. In the section that follows, we in-
troduce two experiments. These tasks were designed to investigate the ef-
fects of putting this system to use. The analyses presented here address the
extent to which implementing CU's class-based affirmative action policy
changes the likelihood of acceptance for low-SES and minority students.76
C. Studying the Impact of the New System
In this section, we detail two experiments designed to gauge the impact
of implementing class-based affirmative action at CU. The first experiment
was conducted in 2009, and the second took place in 2010. Below, we dis-
cuss each experiment in turn. Our analyses focused on four outcomes: (1)
overall acceptance rates, (2) socioeconomic diversity, (3) racial diversity,
and (4) academic quality. As such, each discussion of results is parsed ac-
cording to these four outcomes.
1. 2009 Experiment: Class-Based Versus Race-Based Admissions
In November 2008-after the initial development of this class-based
system-the ballot initiative that would have banned race-conscious affirm-
ative action in Colorado was defeated. The voters' rejection of this measure
presented CU with an opportunity to further "beta test" the Disadvantage
and Overachievement Indices. To gauge the effect of implementing a class-
based approach to replace race-based admissions, this study used a small-
scale repeated-measures experimental design that included 480 applications
randomly selected from the full 2009 applicant pool. Of the 480 applica-
tions sampled, 478 had sufficient information to be included in this experi-
ment. Table 8 presents demographic characteristics for this sample,
including both SES77 and URM78 representation.
6 A second question, "What is the likelihood of college success for students admitted
under CU's class-based policy?," was also part of the initial study. The study results on that
question will be the subject of a subsequent paper.
7 For ease of presentation, a low-SES applicant is defined as having either low parental
income (less than $60,000) or low parental education (neither parent received a college de-
gree). Severely low-SES applicants exhibit both low parental income and low parental
education.
7 Hypothesis testing was carried out using McNemar's test of correlated proportions. See
Quinn McNemar, Note on the Sampling Error o the Difference Between Correlated Propor-
tions or Percentages, 12 PSYCHOMEIRIKA 153, 153-57 (1947).
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TABLE 8. Demographic Characteristics, 2009 Experimental Sample
Applicant Type N Percentage of Total Sample
All Applicants 478 100%
Low SES 121 25%
Severely Low SES 35 7%
URM 48 10%
Each of the selected applications had already been reviewed under the
race-based policy. An additional review of each sampled application was
conducted using CU's class-based approach,79 with all race identifiers re-
moved. Ten admissions officers participated in this experiment. Each re-
viewed roughly fifty applications, and no reviewer evaluated the same
application twice. In this experimental framework, each application func-
tions as its own counterfactual; we observe both the outcome of the "treat-
ment" (i.e., class-based affirmative action) and what would otherwise have
occurred had the treatment not been administered (i.e., the "control" condi-
tion: race-based affirmative action)." It is critical to note that the differ-
ences between the treatment and control conditions are twofold. First, the
treatment condition involves a class-based application review, while the con-
trol condition uses a race-based review. Second, given sufficient disadvan-
tage or overachievement, a class-based identification may constitute a
primary factor, while minority status (i.e., a race-based identification) is al-
ways a secondary factor. Thus, class-based identifications are privileged,
relative to race-based identifications.
7 More specifically, Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices were calculated for each
applicant in the sample, and each applicant was categorized according to the thresholds
presented in Table 6. Based on these categorizations, applicants received either no boost, a
secondary factor boost, or a primary factor boost, as elaborated in Table 7.
so It is important to acknowledge that the 2009 experiment utilized random sampling but
not random assignment. Random sampling provides generalizability, but random assignment
would have addressed some threats to internal validity. Specifically, the conditions of this
experiment may not realistically reflect the environment in which admissions officers make
decisions. The treatment condition (review via the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indi-
ces, without consideration of race) constituted an unofficial admissions decision. Under these
circumstances, it is possible that admissions officers gave more weight to identification under
the Indices than they would have had these class-based decisions been "for keeps." As such,
acceptance rates for low-SES and URM applicants under the class-based condition may be
biased upwards.
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RESULTS
Overall Acceptance Rates. In this experiment, overall acceptance rates
were only slightly higher under the class-based approach than under race-
conscious affirmative action. Under the class-based approach, 76% of appli-
cants were accepted, while under the race-based approach, 74% were
accepted.
Socioeconomic Diversity. Our results suggest low-SES applicants are
more likely to be admitted under class-based than under race-based affirma-
tive action. Acceptance rates for low-SES and severely low-SES applicants
are summarized in Table 9.





Low SES 81% 72% 9%**
Severely Low SES 83% 63% 20%*
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
It is not surprising that acceptance rates improve for low-SES students
under the class-based system. This approach was designed specifically to
identify those applicants for additional consideration. Further, this result
aligns with findings from simulation and empirical studies that informed this
work.,
Racial Diversity. Results for URM applicants were somewhat surpris-
ing. Black, Latino, and Native American applicants were more likely to be
admitted under the class-based approach than under the race-based policy.
Acceptance rates from the 2009 experiment are presented in Table 10.





URM 65% 56% 9%
s See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23, at 46-52; BowEN, KURZwIn & TOBIN, supra note
51, at 183-86; Carnevale & Rose, supra note 43, at 153-54; Sander, supra note 7, at 492-97.
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The pattern shown in Table 10 would seem to contradict prior research,
which generally suggests that class-based affirmative action will increase
socioeconomic diversity and decrease racial diversity, when compared to a
race-based policy.82 In fact, our findings highlight the importance of the size
of the admissions boost in class-based affirmative action. The class-based
approach at CU is comparatively privileged in this context. Under the Dis-
advantage and Overachievement Indices, identification can grant primary
factor consideration. Under race-conscious affirmative action at CU, URM
status is always a secondary factor.
It is this privileging of class-based identifications over race-based iden-
tifications that allows CU's class-based approach to yield higher URM ac-
ceptance rates. Holding constant high-school GPA and standardized-test
scores, URMs are 1.4 times more likely than non-URMs to be admitted
under CU's race-based policy. By contrast, under the Disadvantage and
Overachievement Indices (again holding constant high-school GPA and stan-
dardized-test scores) applicants identified for primary factor consideration
are 5.7 times more likely to be admitted. Just over half of URMs (51%)
receive this class-based primary factor consideration, so the interpretation
seems relatively straightforward: although the Disadvantage and Over-
achievement Indices are somewhat inefficient identifiers of URM applicants,
URMs that this approach does identify are usually granted a bigger boost
than they would receive under race-conscious affirmative action.
Academic Quality. Another focus of our analysis was the academic
credentials of students admitted under each condition. Admissions officers
are attentive to overall acceptance rates and the academic credentials of
freshman students because these statistics affect the university's reputation.
While CU aims to enroll a socioeconomically and racially diverse incoming
class, it is unwilling to sacrifice selectivity standards to do so. Perhaps more
importantly, CU would like to avoid admitting low-SES students who have
little chance at success in college. In Table 11, we provide a summary of
academic credentials for accepted and refused students under the class-based
and race-based experimental conditions. Standard deviations are presented
parenthetically.
82 See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23, at 46-52; BowEN, KURZwIn & TOIN, Supra note
51, at 183-86; Carnevale & Rose, supra note 43, at 153-54; Sander, supra note 7, at 492-97.
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TABLE 11. Academic Credentials by Admissions Condition,
2009 Experiment
Accepted Applicants Refused Applicants
Measure
Class-based Race-based Class-based Race-based
N 365 352 113 126
.56 .58 2.73 2.8
Mean High School PA (0.39) (0.38) (0.31) (0.34)
26 27 23 23
MeanACT Composite (3.7) (3.6) (4) (4.2)
1197 1207 1048 1028
Mean SAT C ombined
(147) (136) (134) (142)
High-school GPAs and ACT scores are nearly identical among accepted
students across conditions, while SAT scores were slightly higher among
students accepted under the race-based policy. In other words, replacing
race-based affirmative action with a class-based approach will not substan-
tially affect aggregate measures of academic qualifications. This should not
be too surprising because class-based affirmative action impacts a relatively
small proportion of CU's full applicant pool. Its implementation can be ex-
pected to only slightly affect the academic credentials of incoming classes.
Table 12 presents a more nuanced view. Here, applicants are differentiated
according to the four possible results from this experiment: (1) admitted
under the class-based system but not under the race-based system, (2) admit-
ted under the race-based system but not under the class-based system, (3)
admitted under both, and (4) refused under both. Standard deviations are
included parenthetically.
As we might expect, applicants accepted under the Disadvantage and
Overachievement Indices who were not accepted under race-based affirma-
tive action (lower-left quadrant of Table 12) exhibit marginal academic cre-
dentials. These students had, on average, substantially lower HSGPAs and
test scores than students admitted under both experimental conditions (up-
per-left quadrant). Admissions officers emphasized that the students admit-
ted under the class-based approach but refused under the race-based system
still met minimum standards for admission. Their high-school grades and
test scores would not preclude success at CU. Still, their substantially lower
academic credentials constitute a noteworthy research finding, which raises
questions about their ability to handle college-level work. Given that any
responsible higher-education admissions policy must consider the likelihood
of success as an important variable, these concerns are serious." Additional
" In the debate over race-conscious affirmative action, student success has played a varia-
ble role. Most controversially, questions about student success have been used to challenge
affirmative action policies on the theory that affirmative action leads to "academic mismatch."
See, e.g., Sander, supra note 7. Sander and other proponents of the "mismatch" theory assert
that under race-based affirmative action, minorities attend colleges for which they are academ-
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TABLE 12. Comparison of Academic Credentials by Category of







Mean High School GPA 3.6 2,89
(0.37) (0.26)
27 24
Mean ACT Composite 27 24
(3.5) (4)
1209 1132
Mean SAT Combiried 1209 1132
(137) (89)
Class-based: Accept Class-based: Refuse
Race-based: Refuse Race-based: Refuse
N 31 95
3.09 2.71
Mean High School GPA 309
(029) (03])
23 22
Mean ACT Composite 23 22
(47) (4)
Mean SAT Combined 992 1037
(167) (135)
empirical analyses suggest some applicants admitted under CU's class-based
approach may fare quite well in college. Specifically, applicants identified
by the Overachievement Indices may outperform typical undergraduates at
CU. Although beyond the scope of this article, these results will be the
focus of a subsequent paper.
ically underprepared, and compete with academically superior peers. This scenario begets
lower grades, lower graduation rates, and lower distal outcomes. Those who disagree point to
significantly higher graduation rates at more selective universities See, e.g., BOWnN & BOK,
supra note 23; ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 31; see also BOWEN, CHINGOS & MC-
PHnRSoN, CROSSING THE FINISH LINE: COMPLETING COLLEGE AT AMERICAS PUB IC UNIVERSI-
TIES 209 (2011). In short, these higher graduation rates completely cancel out decreases in
college grades associated with minority status, and in fact, point to a net gain associated with
minority students enrolling at the most selective schools to which they are admitted. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 631, 666 (2011).
While the mismatch theory has been subject to significant and credible challenge, the larger
issue of how affirmative action (based on class, race, or any other identifier) relates to student
success cannot be ignored.
Measure
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2. 2010 Experiment: Race-Based Versus Class-Plus-Race
Affirmative Action
For the Fall 2011 admissions cycle, CU moved to a hybrid "class-plus-
race" affirmative action framework. Race continued to be used, as it had
been in the past, as a potential secondary factor boost, and the new class-
based system was implemented as detailed in Table 7. To forecast the im-
pact of this change, a randomized controlled experiment was conducted in
2010. As a starting point, 2000 "borderline" applications were randomly
sampled from the Fall 2010 pool. This group was composed of applications
the Office of Admissions determined were neither clear refusals nor clear
admits. Prior research on college admissions suggests that identification by
a class-based affirmative action system will likely carry the most weight for
applicants fitting this profile.84
Half the sample was randomly assigned to application review using
both race and the Indices (i.e., a class-plus-race approach), and the other half
to review using race-based affirmative action only. Under both conditions,
admissions decisions were official. Table 13 presents demographic charac-
teristics of both the class-plus-race and the race-based group."
TABLE 13. Demographic Characteristics, 2010 Experimental Sample
Class-Plus-Race Race-Based
Applicant Type N Percentage of Total N Percentage of Total
Sample Sample
All Applicants 901 100% 912 100%
Low SES 212 24% 195 21%
Severely Low SES 54 6% 55 6%
URI 118 13% 118 13%
The few available simulation studies that compare race-based affirma-
tive action to a class-plus-race approach indicate that a class-plus-race ap-
proach should substantially improve campus socioeconomic diversity and
slightly improve (by one or two percentage points) racial diversity." At this
point, however, no studies have yet been conducted that empirically investi-
gate the impact of implementing a class-plus-race system in undergraduate
admissions.
" See, e.g., WARREN W. WILLINGHAM & HUNTER M. BRELAND, PERSONAL QUALITIES
AND COLLEGE ADMISSION 89-94 (1982).
" Of the 2000 applications sampled, 1813 contained sufficient information to be included
in the experiment. Sample attrition was equivalent across experimental conditions.
" See, e.g., BOWEN, KURZwIn & TOIN, supra note 51, at 178-80; ESPYNSHADE & RAD-




Overall Acceptance Rates. Overall acceptance rates were identical
across experimental conditions, at 62%. This aggregate drop in acceptance
rates compared to the 2009 experiment was expected because the sample
under consideration includes only borderline applicants. Acceptance rates
are equivalent because wealthier applicants were more likely to be accepted
under the race-based condition, and low-income applicants were more likely
to be accepted under the class-plus-race condition. This phenomenon bal-
anced acceptance rates across conditions.
Socioeconomic Diversity. The results of the second experiment are
largely similar to the results of the first. Under class-plus-race admissions,
low-SES applicants have an increased likelihood of acceptance, compared to
race-based admissions. These results are summarized in Table 14.7





Low SES 58% 49% 9%*
Severely Low SES 57% 44% 13%
*p < 0.05
The increased acceptance rates for low-SES applicants under class-
plus-race affirmative action align with prior research. As noted previously,
the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices were designed specifically
to identify and grant additional consideration to low-SES applicants; their
acceptance rates should improve when compared to admissions absent class-
based considerations.
Racial Diversity. Acceptance rates for URMs improved under the
class-plus-race approach. Table 15 presents acceptance rates for these
applicants.
1 Hypothesis testing was carried out using Fisher's exact test. See R.A. Fisher, On the
Interpretation of X2 From Contingency Tables, and the Calculation of P, 85 J. ROYAL STAT.
Soc'y 87, 87-94 (1922).
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URM 62% 45% 17%**
Low SES and URM 59% 27% 32%**
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
On its own, an increase in acceptance rates for URMs under class-plus-
race affirmative action is not surprising. Still, the magnitude of the differ-
ences in acceptance rates for URMs between conditions (seventeen percent-
age points) is much larger than would be anticipated based on previous
simulation studies." One recent study, for example, predicted increases in
acceptance rates around 1.2 percentage points for minorities under class-
plus-race affirmative action. 9 The large difference in URM acceptance rates
is at least partially attributable to a large boost associated with a dual identi-
fication (i.e., being a low-SES and URM applicant) under the class-plus-race
approach."
8 It is important to reiterate that despite the considerable URM acceptance rate boosts
under class-plus-race affirmative action, overall acceptance rates were balanced across condi-
tions because wealthier applicants were less likely to be accepted under the class-plus-race
approach.
8 See ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 31, at 349-50.
G0 The dual-identification effect outstrips the boost granted to URMs under race-based
affirmative action. This sizeable increase in the odds of admission for URMs under a class-
plus-race approach may be due to uneven application of the Indices. Specifically, larger class-
based boosts are being conferred upon URMs than non-URMs. Under the class-plus-race ap-
proach, URMs identified in any way by the Indices are 4.9 times as likely to be admitted as
URMs not identified. In contrast, non-URMs identified by the Indices are 1.9 times as likely
to be admitted as non-URMs not identified by the Indices. A primary factor identification for
URMs is particularly impactful: underrepresented minorities who earn primary factor consid-
eration are 9.2 times as likely to be admitted. In contrast, non-URMs who earn primary factor
consideration are 3.5 times as likely to be admitted. The larger class-based effects for URMs
lead to improved acceptance rates for this group under class-plus-race admissions. In this
case, it seems as though the whole (class-based and race-based considerations for low-SES
minorities) is greater than the sum of its parts. This analysis suggests multiple identifications
under an affirmative action framework are not merely additive. Prior research on this topic has
not dealt specifically with class-based and race-based considerations, but rather with consider-
ations for athletes, legacies, and minorities. One study, for example, concluded that the pres-
ence of multiple identifications (e.g., a minority legacy applicant) are roughly additive in their
effects on the likelihood of admission. See JAMES L. SITULMAN & WI LIAM G. BOWEN, Tn
GAME OF Livn: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 50-55 (2001). Another group of
researchers found that multiple identifications for minorities (e.g., a minority athlete) are actu-
ally less than additive. See Thomas J. Espenshade, Chang Y. Chung & Joan L. Walling, Ad-
mission Preferences ftr Minority Students, Athletes, and Legacies at Elite Universities, 85
Soc. Sci. Q. 1422, 1437-41 (2004).
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Academic Quality. For the 2010 experiment, a comparison of academic
credentials for accepted students yields results nearly identical to those seen
in the 2009 experiment. As such, those results are not discussed in great
detail here. High-school GPAs of students accepted under class-plus-race
affirmative action are slightly lower (by two-hundredths of a grade point)
than the GPAs of students accepted under race-based affirmative action.
Likewise, SAT scores are lower for the class-plus-race group (by five
points), although ACT scores are virtually identical. None of these differ-
ences is statistically significant.9'
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CU STUDY FOR THE FUTURE OF CLAsS-BASED
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
These experiments offer important insight for other institutions consid-
ering whether to adopt class-based affirmative action policies. Perhaps most
importantly, these results challenge the prevailing assumption that class-con-
scious admissions will not be helpful in maintaining racial diversity on cam-
pus. Additionally, this study is the first empirical analysis of affirmative
action's impact on admissions decisions at a moderately selective university.
CU represents a certain class of institution-large, moderately selective
public universities-that has up to this point been underrepresented in af-
firmative action scholarship. This knowledge gap is significant because
large public schools account for more than half of the total undergraduate
enrollment in the United States.92 Moreover, research suggests that unlike
highly selective schools, these moderately selective institutions field applica-
tions from disadvantaged students for whom the stakes are quite high: many
low-income and minority applicants may not have the opportunity to attend
a four-year college if they are refused admission to a school like CU.'
The prior research on the prospects of class-based affirmative action-
most notably William Bowen and Derek Bok's work in The Shape of the
River-focuses on race-conscious and class-conscious strategies at elite,
highly selective colleges. 94 At many selective private and public schools, the
admissions boost for minority status is quite large.' The University of Colo-
rado at Boulder is a different sort of institution. Two features in particular
distinguish CU from the institutions most often included in prior research on
1 It may be tempting to compare the results from the 2009 experiment to those of the
2010 experiment. Such comparisons may not be valid. First, the 2010 experiment uses a
modified treatment-class-plus-race affirmative action rather than class-based affirmative ac-
tion-as a replacement for the race-based control condition. Second, the 2010 experiment
examines a different population-borderline applicants-than the 2009 experiment, which
drew from the full applicant pool. With so many adjustments from one experiment to the next,
it is safest to view these experiments' results as complementary but not directly comparable.
92 See SNYDER & DILLOW, supra note 17, at 270.
See Hurtado et al., supra note 35, at 64-66.
* See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23.
9 See, e.g., ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 31, at 112; Long, supra note 55, at 318;
Long, supra note 38, at 1025-27.
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affirmative action. First, while still the flagship public university in Colo-
rado, CU's overall acceptance rate is much higher than those reported at
highly selective colleges. The acceptance rate at CU in 2011 was about
84%, while at Harvard, 6% of applicants were accepted; Yale accepted about
7% of applicants; and the University of California, Berkeley accepted about
22%.96 CU is more similar to its peer public universities, such as the Univer-
sity of Kansas (92.75% acceptance), University of Arizona (71%), Univer-
sity of Iowa (76%), and University of Oregon (73%).97
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the admissions boost associated
with minority status at CU is relatively small. CU is more like other moder-
ately selective institutions in this regard.98 While schools are reluctant to
release information about how minority status affects admissions chances,
researchers have found that the size of the boost for minority status is much
smaller at less selective schools.99 Where the race-related boost is relatively
small, a significant class-related boost can make a considerable difference.
Indeed, this study suggests that the effectiveness of class-based affirma-
tive action with respect to maintaining racial diversity hinges upon the sizes
of the boosts class-based systems confer. Poverty and minority status are
not perfectly correlated, so if class is intended to replace race in college
admissions, the boost attached to an identification of disadvantage or over-
achievement must substantially outdo the boost attached to minority status.
Universities with admissions frameworks similar to CU's-those that place
relatively little weight on minority status and are willing to place substantial
weight on class-based measures-should be able to replicate these findings.
At highly selective schools, however, it may not always be feasible to enact
class-based considerations that are appreciably larger than the sizeable race-
based considerations already in place.
One of the challenges of evaluating the effectiveness of any type of
affirmative action program is that schools are generally extremely reluctant
to publish any data on how affirmative action affects the admissions process.
Much of this reluctance is a consequence of the legally and politically
charged debates over the use of race-conscious policies.'(" The empirical
" See Jacques Steinberg, Admissions Figures at Elon, Harvey Mudd, Brandeis and Nearly
100 Other Colleges, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 4, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/04/04/admissions-figures-04-04/.
" Id.; see also National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.
usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/data (last visited
May 18, 2013).
" It may be that race-based admissions preferences at CU and schools like it diminished
in the wake of the Gratz decision and multiple successful state-level ballot initiatives. That is,
public colleges may exercise caution when implementing race-based affirmative action to
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vacuum that has surrounded much of the debate about affirmative action has
significantly diminished the quality of that debate. One benefit of class-
based affirmative action is that schools may be more willing to identify the
impact of different policy choices.
V. CONCLUSION
Class-based affirmative action is complex. A class-based approach-
by definition and often by law-must be designed to measure one thing
(class) while its architects often hope to conveniently proxy another (race).
Moreover, the system to which a class-based approach is compared is usu-
ally quite simple. Race-conscious affirmative action relies on an observable
binary indicator-minority/non-minority-to confer additional considera-
tion in admissions. Class-based approaches offer no such simplicity. Even
if thresholds of disadvantage and overachievement are established, as is the
case with the study presented here, considerable care must be taken in defin-
ing and justifying those thresholds.
Moreover, even if, as we demonstrate here, class-conscious policies
may successfully maintain racial diversity in some school contexts, there are
good reasons not to think of one as a substitute for the other. Broadly, the
values that underlie both race-conscious and class-conscious affirmative ac-
tion are the same: a conviction that diversity enhances the educational envi-
ronment, an understanding that merit is something more than scores on
standardized tests and high-school grades, and a concern that students who
have faced disadvantages are often underestimated and therefore passed over
for opportunities that will help them overcome those disadvantages. But the
challenges associated with low socioeconomic status are different from those
associated with minority status. Of course, if the Supreme Court does one
day close the door to race-conscious admissions policies, class-based affirm-
ative action may have to serve as a substitute. There are, however, good
reasons to maintain race-conscious admissions policies and separate good
reasons to consider class in the admissions calculus. Ideally, both will con-
tinue to be options.
The future of race-conscious admissions decisions notwithstanding,
giving additional admissions consideration to students who have overcome
the challenges attendant to socioeconomic disadvantage is a worthwhile en-
deavor. Whether class-based programs end up replacing race-conscious ad-
missions plans or supplementing them, this study demonstrates the potential
for class-based affirmative action.
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APPENDIX A. Visual Representation of the Disadvantage Index
For the purposes of illustration, the probability of enrollment in a four-
year college is plotted as a function of SAT combined score for two groups
of applicants-those with typical socioeconomic characteristics and those
with socioeconomic characteristics indicating disadvantage. It is important
to point out that the ogive representing typical CU applicants remains fixed
because the socioeconomic characteristics of the typical applicant are fixed.
The ogive representing a disadvantaged applicant, however, may vary as a
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APPENDIX B. Visual Representation of the Overachievement Index (SAT)
For the purposes of illustration, SAT combined score is plotted as a
function of one socioeconomic measure: the school-wide percentage of stu-
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